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THE GORDIAN KNOT OF THE TREATMENT OF SECONDHAND
FACTS UNDER FEDERAL RULE OF EVIDENCE 703 GOVERNING
THE ADMISSIBILITY OF EXPERT OPINIONS: ANOTHER
CONFLICT BETWEEN LOGIC AND LAW
Edward J. Imwinkelried

"

"The life of the law has not been logic ....
-Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Common Law 1 (1881)

Some commentators have suggested that the American judicial hearing is
becoming trial by expert.' In the early 1990s, the Rand Corporation released a study of the
use of experts in trials in California courts of general jurisdiction.2 Expert witnesses
appeared in 86% of the trials studied, and on average there were 3.3 experts per trial. 3 It is
undeniable that in the United States the role of expert witnesses is growing.
Although commentators sometimes refer to the role of the expert at trial, in truth
witnesses who qualify as experts can play at least four different roles. Suppose, for
example, that an eminent toxicologist is driving to work and observes a traffic accident.
Like any witness who has personal knowledge of a fact, the toxicologist could testify at
the trial against the driver that she observed the defendant's car run a red light.4 Next, if
the toxicologist had attempted to help the drivers and smelt a strong odor of alcohol on the
defendant's breath, the toxicologist would be competent to give the lay opinion that the
defendant was intoxicated.5 Thirdly, suppose that the defendant were prosecuted for drunk
driving, and the arresting officer testified that on an intoxilyzer test the defendant
registered 0.13, exceeding the statutory limit of 0.08.6 At the same trial, the prosecutor
could call the toxicologist to provide expert testimony about the general reliability of
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intoxilyzers as a method of determining blood alcohol concentrations.'
Although an expert witness can play any of the above roles, in most instances the
attorney calling the witness wants him or her to perform a fourth function, namely, to
apply a general theory or technique to the specific facts in the case to generate an opinion.
When the expert witness plays this role, the structure of the witness's testimony is
essentially syllogistic." In a classic syllogism, the logician applies a major premise to a
minor premise to derive a conclusion.9 When an expert witness testifies in this syllogistic
manner, the expert's major premise is the general theory or technique that he or she relies
on. 10 For example, a psychiatrist who testifies as an expert witness might posit a set of
diagnostic criteria for a particular mental illness: If the patient displays symptoms A and
B, the patient is probably suffering from psychosis C. The psychiatrist's minor premise is
the case-specific data that he applies the major premise to: This patient's case history
includes symptoms A and B. The psychiatrist's conclusion is the opinion generated when
he employs the general theory to evaluate the significance of the particular facts in the
case: Ergo, the patient is probably suffering from psychosis C.
In its landmark decision on the admissibility of scientific evidence, Daubert v.
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.," the United States Supreme Court indicated that
Federal Rule of Evidence 702 governs the question of which theories or techniques an
expert may rely on as a major premise.12 The Court held that to serve as a basis for expert
testimony, the theory or technique must qualify as reliable "scientific . . . knowledge"
within the meaning of that expression in Rule 702.13 In contrast, Federal Rule of Evidence
703 answers the question of the types of case-specific data that the expert may rely on as
the minor premise.1 4 Effective December 1, 2011, restyled Rule 703 reads:
An expert may base an opinion on facts or data in the case that the expert has
been made aware of or personally observed. If experts in the particular field would
reasonably rely on those kinds of facts or data in forming an opinion on the subject, they
need not be admissible for the opinion to be admitted. But if the facts or data would
otherwise be inadmissible, the proponent of the opinion may disclose them to the jury only
if their probative value in helping the jury to evaluate the opinion substantially outweighs
their prejudicial effect. 15

'Federal Rule of Evidence 702 permits an expert to "testify only in the form of an opinion." FED. R. EVID. 702.
The original Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 702 state:
Most of the literature assumes that experts testify only in the form of opinions. The
assumption is logically unfounded. The rule accordingly recognizes that an expert on the
stand may give a dissertation or exposition of scientific or other principles relevant to the
case, leaving the trier of fact to apply them to the facts.
Id.
Edward J. Imwinkelried, The EducationalSignificance ofthe Syllogistic Structure ofExpert Testimony, 87 Nw.
U. L. REV. 1148 (1993); Edward J. Imwinkelried, The 'Bases'ofExpert Testimony: The Syllogistic Structure of
Scientific Testimony, 67 N.C. L. REv. 1 (1988).
9 Imwinkelried, The EducationalSignificance ofthe Syllogistic Structure ofExpert Testimony, supra note 8.
'oId. at 1148.
509 U.S. 579 (1993).
12

Id. at 589-90.

13

Id.

14 Edward J. Imwinkelried, Developing a Coherent Theory ofthe Structure ofFederalRule ofEvidence 703, 47
MERCERL. REV. 447, 457 (1996); Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Meaning of "Factsor Data" in FederalRule of
Evidence 703: The Significance ofthe Supreme Court's Decision to Rely on FederalRule 702 in Daubertv.
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,Inc., 54 MD. L. REv. 352, 372-73 (1995).

" FED. R. EVID. 703.
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Since Rule 702 served as the foundation for the Court's celebrated Daubert
decision, Rule 702 has been the principal focus of the scholarly commentary on scientific
evidence.16 However, Rule 703 has proved to be the more controversial
statute and has
17
produced a larger number of splits of authority among the lower courts.
Until 2012, the United States Supreme Court itself had not entered the fray over
Rule 703. However, in June 2012, the Supreme Court finally considered a case, Williams
v. Illinois," in which Rule 703 played a prominent role. Technically, Williams is a
constitutional criminal procedure decision that governs only in prosecutions. 19 However,
as we shall soon see, Williams raises questions about Rule 703 that apply to both civil and
criminal litigation.
Williams was charged with rape and his case was set for trial.2 0 Cellmark is a
private laboratory conducting DNA testing. 21 Before Williams's trial, Cellmark extracted
22
a male DNA profile from the rape victim's vaginal swab. Cellmark sent the profile
information to the Illinois State Police Laboratory (ISP). 23 At the laboratory Ms. Sandra
Lambatos, an ISP specialist, found a match when she compared the Cellmark profile to
24
that of the accused. Ms. Lambatos testified at William's bench trial and answered the
following question in the affirmative:
Was there a computer match generated of the male DNA profile found in semen
from the vaginal swabs of [L.J.] to a male profile that had been identified as having
originated from Sandy Williams?25
The issue posed in Williams was whether Lambatos's reference to Cellmark's
26
statement about the male DNA profile violated the Sixth Amendment. In 2004 in
27
Crawford v. Washington, the Supreme Court announced that the Sixth Amendment
Confrontation Clause precludes the admission of "testimonial" hearsay statements at trial
unless (1) the accused had a prior opportunity to question the declarant and (2) the
declarant is unavailable at trial.28 However, the Crawford Court also indicated that the
Confrontation Clause does not apply to a statement if, at trial, the statement is admitted for
a nonhearsay purpose, that is, for a purpose other than proof of the truth of the assertion in
the statement. 29
In Williams, the prosecution argued that Lambatos's testimony did not violate the

16

Imwinkelried, The Meaning of "Factsor Data" in FederalRule ofEvidence 703, supra note 14, at 358 n.54.
Imwinkelried, Developing a Coherent Theory ofthe Structure ofFederalRule ofEvidence 703, supra note 14.
132 S. Ct. 2221 (2012); see Richard D. Friedman, Confrontation and ForensicLaboratoryReports, Round

Four, 45 Tex. Tech L. Rev. 51 (2012); United States v. Turner, 709 F.3d 1187, 1189 (7th Cir. 2013) ("[T]he
divergent analyses and conclusions of the plurality and dissent sow confusion as to precisely what limitations the
Confrontation Clause may impose when an expert witness testifies about the results of testing performed by
another analyst, who herself is not called to testify at trial.").
19 See id.
20

Id. at 2227.

21

Id.

22

Id. at 2229.

23

Id.

24

Id.

25

Id. at 2236.
Id. at 2238.
541 U.S. 36 (2004).

26

27
28

Id. at 59.

29

Id. at 59 n. 9 (quoting Tennessee v. Street, 471 U.S. 409, 414 (1985)).
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Confrontation Clause because the reference to the Cellmark statement was not offered for
the hearsay purpose of proving the truth of the assertion that the vaginal swab contained
that male DNA profile. 3 0 Rather, according to the prosecution, the reference was used for
the limited, nonhearsay purpose of showing the basis of Ms. Lambatos's opinion and
helping the trier of fact to evaluate the quality of Ms. Lambatos's reasoning.31 Both
32
Federal Rule 703 and Illinois law permit expert witnesses to rely on third-party out-of33
court statements for that purpose. In Williams, however, five justices (the "703 majority"
including Justice Thomas in concurrence and four dissenters led by Justice Kagan) found
that Cellmark's statement had been used for a substantive purpose at trial.3 4 The justices
contended that it is illogical to allow the trier of fact to consider an expert opinion that
rests on premises that are unsupported by admissible evidence.3 5
At the same time, another five-justice majority (the "Crawford majority"
including Justice Thomas and a four-justice plurality led by Justice Alito) mooted the Rule
36
703 issue by holding that Cellmark's statement was not testimonial to begin with. Based
37
on that holding, these five justices voted to affirm Williams' conviction. For its part, the
plurality characterized the statement as non-testimonial because the police had not
identified any suspect at the time of Cellmark's test. 38 Justice Thomas also characterized
the statement as non-testimonial, but he did so for an entirely different reason, namely, the
relative informality of the statement. 39 Given the fragmented nature of the decision, the
narrowest common ground supporting the affirmance is arguably the proposition that a
forensic analyst's statement is non-testimonial if it is both informal and made before the
40
police identified a particular suspect.
The Crawford ruling in Williams is of concern only to criminal practitioners; the
ruling relates to a Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause limitation on prosecution
hearsay. In contrast, although the Crawford ruling formally mooted the Rule 703 issue,
many lower courts will undoubtedly pay attention to the reasoning of the 703 majority;
any time five members of the Supreme Court agree on a proposition, lower court judges
tend to sit up and pay attention. The 703 majority's reasoning applies not only to expert
evidence offered against a criminal accused but also to expert testimony offered by civil
42
litigants. What precisely does Rule 703 authorize? Does the use sanctioned by Rule 703
constitute a legitimate nonhearsay use of an out-of-court statement? If not, how should the
courts apply Rule 703 in the future?
The 703 majority's position has substantial merit. The thesis of this article,
however, is that although the falsity of an essential premise of an expert opinion can
render the opinion irrelevant, in most cases it is sound to assign the ultimate relevance
30

Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2230-33.

31 Id.
32

Id. at 2234-35.

33Id.
34
3
36

3
3
39
40

Id. at 2256-59 (Thomas, J., concurring), 2268-72 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
See id. at 2255-56 (Thomas, J., concurring), 2264-73 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2240, 2255 (Thomas, J., concurring).
Id. at 2244 (majority opinion).
Id. at 2243-44.
Id. at 2259-60.
Hugh B. Kaplan, Commentary, CriminalLaw - Confrontation:DividedSupreme Court Says DNA Expert Can

TestifyAbout Profile CreatedBy Others, 80 U.S.L.W. 1747 (2012).
41 Williams, 132 S. Ct.
at 2247.
42 See id. at 2247-48 (Breyer, J.,
concurring).
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decision to the jury. In the typical case it is more satisfactory to use the sort of jury
instructions approvingly mentioned in Justice Alito's plurality opinion than to empower
the judge to exclude the opinion. 43 The first part of this article surveys the state of Rule
703 jurisprudence prior to the Williams decision. The second part describes the positions
on the Rule 703 issue that the various justices took in Williams. The third part highlights
the stakes involved in the dispute between the 703 majority and the plurality. The fourth
and final part of the article evaluates the merits of the competing positions both as a matter
of logic and as a question of statutory construction.

I.

THE STATE OF RULE 703 JURISPRUDENCE ON SECONDHAND REPORTS BEFORE
THE WILLIAMs DECISION

As previously stated, Rule 703 regulates the permissible sources for information
about the case-specific data that the expert witness relies on as a basis for an opinion.
What are the sources from which the expert may draw information about, for example, a
patient's case history or skidmarks and debris found at a traffic accident scene?
A.

The State of the Law Prior to the Enactment of Federal Rule of
Evidence 703

At early common law, there was only one permissible source for the expert's
knowledge of case-specific information: the expert's firsthand, personal knowledge.
However, it soon became apparent that the personal knowledge limitation was unrealistic;
it was frightfully time-consuming for the expert to personally confirm every fact that he or
she intended to use as a basis for the opinion.
Consequently, the common law developed the technique of the hypothetical
technique, other witnesses supplied admissible evidence of the facts,
the attorney asked the expert witness to hypothetically assume the truth of those facts, and
the expert testified to an opinion based on the assumed facts:
question.46 Using this

Dr. Worth, please assume the following facts as true: One, in the accident, the
plaintiff sustained a cut three inches in length and 1/8 inch in depth on the right, front part
of his head. Two, the plaintiff bled profusely from that cut. Three, immediately after that
accident, the plaintiff experienced sharp, painful headaches in the right, front part of his
head.
Based on those facts, to a reasonable degree of medical probability, do you have
an opinion as to the nature of the injury the plaintiff suffered?
In most cases, the trial judge did not allow the attorney to pose the question to the
expert unless the attorney had already presented enough admissible evidence to permit
the jurors to find that all the assumed facts were true.4 9 It is true that in most jurisdictions
4

See id. at 2233-34 (majority opinion).

44

Imwinkelried,

Developing a Coherent Theory ofthe Structure ofFederalRule ofEvidence 703, supra note 14;

Imwinkelried, The Meaning of "Factsor Data" in FederalRule ofEvidence 703, supra note 14.
45 1 MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 14, at 87(6th ed. 2006).
46

Id. at 89-90.

47 EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, EVIDENTIARY FOUNDATIONS

§ 9.03(4)(d)

(8th ed. 2012).

48 See Paul R. Rice, Inadmissible Evidence as a Basis for Expert Opinion Testimony: A Response
to Professor

Carlson, 40 VAND. L. REV. 583, 587 (1987); see also DAVID H. KAYE, DAVID E. BERNSTEIN & JENNIFER L.
MNOOKIN, THE NEW WIGMORE: A TREATISE ON EVIDENCE - EXPERT EVIDENCE § 4.5, at 154 (2d ed. 2010) (part

of "the evidentiary record").
49 3 CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 7:15, at 892-94 (3d ed. 2007).
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the judge had discretion to allow the opinion before the presentation of the admissible
evidence and subject to the attorney's later presentation of the evidence.5 0 The trial judge
might exercise discretion to permit the later presentation of the foundational evidence if,
for instance, the only source of admissible evidence of a certain fact was a physician
whose surgical schedule precluded her from testifying before the expert witness. Absent
such exceptional circumstances, however, trial judges rarely deviated from the
requirement that the admissible evidence be presented prior to admission of the expert's
opinion. If a judge did admit the expert opinion first and the attorney later neglected to
submit the promised evidence, the trial judge might have to strike the expert's opinion; if
the judge believed that it was unrealistic to believe that the jury could follow a curative
instruction to disregard the stricken testimony, the judge might have to declare a mistrial.
As a general rule at common law, if the expert lacked personal knowledge of a
fact and the expert's proponent failed to present other admissible evidence of that fact, the
expert could not base an opinion even partially on that fact.52 Prior to the adoption of the
Federal Rules of Evidence,5 3 there were only two notable exceptions to the general rule.
One exception dealt with testimony by expert physicians. 4 Under this exception,
physicians could rely on statements describing the patient's symptoms even if the
statements were not admissible under a recognized hearsay exception.5 5 The second
56
exception concerned real estate valuation experts. It allowed experts who testified about
real estate values to base their opinions on "sources that were technically [inadmissible]
hearsay-price lists, newspapers, information about comparable sales, or other secondary
sources."57 In In re Cliquot's Champagne," a leading 1865 decision, the Supreme Court
approved this practice.5 9 In justifying its decision, the Court commented that courts
"should not encumber the law with rules which will involve labor and expense to the
parties, and delay the progress of the remedy ... without giving any additional safeguard
in the interests of justice."60 With those two exceptions, though, the courts forbade experts
from relying on inadmissible secondhand reports61 of facts as a basis for their opinions.62
B.

The Change Effected by the Enactment of Rule 703

Like the prior common law, Rule 703 permits experts to base opinions on facts
that are observed personally and hypotheses that are supported by independent, admissible
63
evidence. The first sentence of Rule 703 states that an expert may base an opinion "on
facts or data in the case that the expert has . . personally observed."64 The same sentence
also allows the expert to consider "facts or data in the case that the expert has been made
soId. § 7:15, at 894.
* See id.
52

53

§ 7:15, at 894

n.13.

See 1 MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE
Id.

§ 7:16,

EVIDENCE

§ 14,

at 89 (6th ed. 2006); id.

§ 7:15,

at 897.

at 897; 29 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & VICTOR JAMES GOLD, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE:

§ 6271(13)-(14),

at 302-04 (1997).

5 KAYE ET AL., supra note 48, at 155-56.

Id. § 4.5.
Id.
7

1

§ 4.5.1,

at 154-55.

Id. § 4.5.1, at 154.

"70 U.S. 114 (1865).
59

Id. at 141.

60

Id.

61

MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 49

§ 7.13,

at 886.

62 Id.
63

FED. R. EVID. 703.

64 Id.
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aware of."65 That language is broad enough to include facts mentioned in a hypothetical
question posed to the expert, and the Advisory Committee Note accompanying Rule 703
expressly endorses the continued use of the hypothetical question. 66
While the first sentence largely tracks the earlier common law, the second
sentence introduces an important innovation with respect to secondhand reports.67 That
sentence reads: "If experts in the particular field would reasonably rely on those kinds of
facts or data in forming an opinion on the subject, they need not be admissible for the
opinion to be admitted."6 Thus, secondhand out-of-court reports can serve as a basis for
an opinion even when the report is neither admitted nor admissible.69 This provision does
not purport to be a hearsay exception7 o authorizing the trier of fact to consider the content
of the report for its truth. 1 The provision appears in Article VII governing opinion
evidence, rather than Article VIII regulating hearsay.72 Hence, the secondhand report is
admissible only for the limited credibility 73 purpose of helping the trier of fact to
understand the basis of the expert's opinion.74 Given that purpose, under Federal Rule of
Evidence 105 7 the trial judge must give the jury a limiting instruction on the opponent's
request.76 The instruction must forbid the jury from treating the report as substantive
evidence in the case and explain the permissible nonhearsay use of the evidence.
Even when Rule 703 was initially adopted, there was sharp criticism of the
provision permitting the expert to rely on inadmissible secondhand reports as a basis for
an opinion. In particular, Professor Paul Rice derided the provision as illogical.78
Anticipating the position of the 703 majority in Williams, Professor Rice argued that in
order to accept the ultimate opinion, the factfinder necessarily had to accept the truth of
the bases for the opinion. 79 In his view, if the factfinder did not assume the truth of the
bases, it made no logical sense to accept the opinion purportedly supported by the bases;o
the falsity of the premises rendered the opinion itself irrelevant and inadmissible. 1
Moreover, at the time Rule 703 was adopted, many, if not most, other courts in the rest of
the common law world still adhered to the traditional view that an expert could not base
an opinion on secondhand reports that did not qualify for admission under the hearsay

65

Id.

66

Id.

67

MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 49

6

§ 7.13,

at 886.

FED. R. EVID. 703.

69

3 STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG, MICHAEL M. MARTIN & DANIEL J. CAPRA, FEDERAL RULES OF
EVIDENCE

MANUAL §703.02[1], at 703-3 (Matthew Bender,
70

10

th

ed. 2011).

4 JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S FEDERAL EVIDENCE §703.05[2] at 703-24-26

(Joseph M. McClaughin, ed., Matthew Bender 2d ed. 1997).
71 Id.
72

7

FED. R. EVID. 703.
SALTZBURGETAL., supra note 69 §703.02[4], at 703-8.

74 See id.
75
76

§703.02[4], at 703-8-9.

FED. R. EVID. 105.
Id.

Id.
Rice, supranote 48, at 585-86 (arguing that it is illogical for courts to admit an expert's opinion without
admitting the facts that formed the basis for the expert's opinion).
79 Id. at 585.
77

7'

o Id. at 584-85.
g' Id.
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rule. In the words of one Canadian commentator, logically it was 'quite impossible" to
justify admitting an expert opinion as substantive evidence when the opinion's essential
premises lacked supporting, admissible evidence.83 Although most states followed the
federal lead and adopted a version of Rule 703 essentially identical to the federal statute,
some states balked. For example, Ohio substituted a rule requiring that the expert base
his or her opinion either on facts the expert had perceived or facts admitted into
evidence.
Nevertheless, the Advisory Committee defended the provision as follows:
[T]he rule is designed to broaden the basis for expert opinions
beyond that current in many jurisdictions and to bring the judicial
practice into line with the practice of the experts themselves when not in
court. Thus a physician in his own practice bases his diagnosis on
information from numerous sources and of considerable variety,
including statements by patients and relatives, reports and opinions from
nurses, technicians and other doctors, hospital records, and X rays. Most
of them are admissible in evidence, but only with the expenditure of
substantial time in producing and examining various authenticating
witnesses. The physician makes life-and-death decisions in reliance
upon them. His validation, experts performed and subject to crossexamination, ought to suffice for judicial purposes.86
The drafters' reference to the needless expenditure of time echoed the Supreme
Court's

19

th

century decision in the Cliquot's Champagne case.

With few dissents," it became the orthodox position that under Rule 703
secondhand reports can be used for a legitimate nonhearsay purpose,8 namely, allowing
the trier of fact to assess the bases of the expert's opinion90 and the quality of the expert's
reasoning.91 It was also the conventional wisdom that a limiting instruction was the proper
mechanism for ensuring that the trier of fact considered the secondhand report only for
nonhearsay purposes.92

82 Edward J. Imwinkelried, A ComparativistCritique ofthe Interface Between Hearsay and Expert Opinion in
American Evidence Law, 33 B.C. L. REV. 1, 23-26 (1991) (citing authorities from Canada, New Zealand,

Scotland, and South Africa).
8

J.H. HOLLIES, Hearsayas the Basis of Opinion Evidence, in 10 THE CRIMINAL LAW QUARTERLY 288, 303

(Claude C. Savage ed., 1968).
84

2 GREGORY P. JOSEPH & STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG, EVIDENCE IN AMERICA: THE FEDERAL RULES IN THE

STATES §52.1, at 1 (1987).
85

Id.

86

FED. R. EVID. 703 advisory committee's note.

" In re Cliquot's Champagne, 70 U.S. 114, 141 (1865) (courts "should not encumber the law with rules which
will involve labor and expense to the parties, and delay the progress of the remedy ... without giving any
additional safeguard to the interests of justice").
" See 29 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & VICTOR JAMES GOLD, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: FEDERAL

RULES OF EVIDENCE
89

§ 6272

(1997)

3 BARBARA E. BERGMAN & NANCY HOLLANDER, WHARTON'S CRIMINAL EVIDENCE

§

13.11, at 456 n. 17

(15th ed. 1999)(citing Barrett v. Acevedo, 169 F.3d 1155 (8th Cir. 1999); MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra

§ 703.04[4] at 703-8 to 703-9.
Id. at 703-9; BERGMAN & HOLLANDER, supra note 89 § 13.11, at 457 (citing Barrettv. Acevedo,
1155 (8th Cir. 1999); MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 49 § 7:16 at 912-13.
note 49

§ 7:16,

at 910; SALTZBURGET AL., supra note 69

90

91 SALTZBURGET AL., supra note 69

§ 703-9.
§

92 BERGMAN & HOLLANDER, supra note 89

169 F.3d

13.11, at 457.
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THE POSITIONS OF THE JUSTICES IN WILLIAMS ON THE EVIDENTIARY STATUS
OF SECONDHAND REPORTS USED UNDER RULE 703

In Williams, Justice Alito wrote for a four-justice plurality, Justice Breyer filed a
concurrence, Justice Thomas concurred in the judgment, and Justice Kagan authored an
opinion for a four-justice dissent. 93 The opinions written by Justices Alito, Thomas, and
Kagan all addressed the topic of the evidentiary status 94 of secondhand reports ostensibly
admitted for the limited purpose of establishing the basis for an expert opinion. 95
A.

Justice Alito's Plurality Opinion

For the most part, Justice Alito's opinion endorses the conventional wisdom
described above in subpart I.B. Justice Alito points out that in Williams the prosecutor did
not attempt to introduce the Cellmark report itself during Ms. Lambatos's testimony.96 He
then insists that the secondhand oral report about Cellmark's finding was not used to
prove the truth of the assertions in the report: "Lambatos did not testify to the truth" of the
male DNA profile found by Cellmark. 97 Quoting the Advisory Committee Note to Rule
703, Justice Alito stated that secondhand reports such as the reference to Cellmark's
finding "assist[t] the jury to evaluate the expert's opinion."9 The justice asserted that "the
disclosure of basis evidence can help the factfinder understand the expert's thought
process and determine what weight to give to the expert's opinion." 99 The justice then
elaborated on the possible nonhearsay uses of secondhand reports. 100 For example, in the
plurality's view the factfinder may weigh the reports to determine whether "the expert
drew an unwarranted inference from the premises on which the expert relied." 101 In other
words, assuming arguendo the truth of the premises, do the premises provide adequate
support for the opinion? Alternatively, the factfinder could consider the secondhand
reports to decide whether "the expert's reasoning [process] was . . . illogical."102 Did the
expert commit any evident logical fallacies in reasoning about and from the premises to
the conclusion embodied in the opinion? The factfinder can conduct both of those
inquiries regardless of the truth of the assertions in the secondhand reports.103
However, Justice Alito acknowledged that the falsity of the secondhand reports
can sometimes render the ultimate opinion irrelevant.104 He stated that [iff there was no
proof that Cellmark produced an accurate profile based on that sample, Lambatos' [s]
,105
testimony regarding the match would be irrelevant ....
Justice Alito does not propose,

93 Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2227.
94

Rice, supranote 48, at 583.

95 132 S. Ct. at 2233-69.

Id. at 2235 ("Lambatos ... made no other reference to the Cellmark report, which was not admitted into
evidence and was not seen by the trier of fact.").
96

97 Id.
98

Id. at 2239-40.

99 Id. at 2240.
100

Id.

101

Id.

102

id.

103

id.

104

Id at 2237.

Id at 2238. For that matter, in addition to demonstrating the scientific soundness of the analysis of the sample,
the prosecution must establish the chain of custody for the sample analyzed; to do so the prosecution must
'0'

present independent, admissible evidence of the chain. PAUL C. GIANNELLI, EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, ANDREA
ROTH & JANE CAMPBELL MORIARTY, SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE § 7.03 (5th ed. 2012); The identification of physical

evidence, including chain of custody, is a conditional relevance issue. Edward J. Imwinkelried, Determining
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however, that the irrelevance problem be dealt with by tasking the trial judge to pass on
the sufficiency of any independent admissible evidence of the fact mentioned in the
secondhand report, as the judge would do today if the issue were the sufficiency of the
foundation for a hypothetical question.106 Instead, he seems to contemplate that the trial
judge will give the jurors instructions assigning the relevance determination to them. 1 0 7
Near the end of his opinion, Justice Alito endorses the general proposition that "the trial
judges may, and under most circumstances, must instruct the jury . . . that an expert's
opinion is only as good as the independent evidence that establishes its underlying
premises." 108 Justice Alito's opinion goes farther. Earlier in the opinion, in discussing
hypothetical questions, Justice Alito approvingly quoted a jury instruction from Forsyth v.
Doolittle.10 9 The instruction informed the jurors that '[i]f the statements in these questions
are not supported by the proof, then the answers to the questions are entitled to no weight,
because based upon false assumptions or statements of fact." 110 Near the end of his
opinion and immediately after discussing jury instructions, Justice Alito harks back to
Forsyth and adds that "if the prosecution cannot muster any independent admissible
evidence to prove the foundational facts that are essential to the relevance of the expert's
testimony, then the expert's testimony cannot be given any weight by the trier of fact." 1
That passage lends itself to the interpretation that, rather than precluding the proponent
from exposing the jury to the opinion, the judge is to charge the jury to disregard the
opinion if it finds that the prosecution has failed to muster such "independent admissible
evidence." 1 1 2
B.

Justice Thomas' Concurrence

As previously stated, Justice Thomas concurred in the judgment affirming
Williams's conviction.113 He agreed with the plurality's conclusion that the Cellmark
report was not testimonial. 11 4 The plurality reached that conclusion on the ground that the
primary purpose of the report:
was not to accuse petitioner or to create evidence for use at trial. When
the ISP lab sent the sample to Cellmark, its primary purpose was to
catch a dangerous rapist who was still at large, not to obtain evidence for
use against petitioner, who was neither in custody nor under suspicion at
that time."
view

Justice Thomas found the plurality's rationale unpersuasive. 116 However, in his
only statements "bearing 'indicia of solemnity"' can constitute testimonial

PreliminaryFacts Under FederalRule 104, 45 AM. JUR. TRIALS 1, 44 - 45 (1992). Consequently, the
prosecution's foundational testimony must satisfy the technical evidentiary rules. Id. at 58. If the record did not
contain such evidence, on proper motion the defense would be entitled to a judgment of acquittal as a matter of
law. FED. R. CRIM. P. 29. However, in Williams the various opinions do not discuss this argument as an
alternative basis for disposing of the case.
106

132 S. Ct. at 2241.

107

id.

10g

Id.

109

Id at 2234.

1o

Id (quoting Forsyth v. Doolittle, 120 U.S. 73, 77 (1887)) (emphasis added).

112

Id at 2241 (emphasis added).
id

113

Id. at 2255-65.

114

Id. at 2255 (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment).

. Id. at 2243 (plurality opinion).
116 Id. at 2258-60 (Thomas, J., concurring
in judgment).
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assertions.1 1 7 On that basis he distinguished the relatively formal forensic certificates that
the Court had previously ruled testimonial in Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts1

and

Bullcoming v. New Mexico. 119 The upshot of Justice Thomas's perspective was that
although he rejected the plurality's reason for characterizing the report as nontestimonial,
he reached the same result as the plurality and, hence, cast the fifth vote affirming the
- - 120
conviction.
Just as he rejected the plurality reasoning on the testimonial issue, Justice
Thomas rebuffed the plurality's position on Rule 703.121 He declared that "[t]here is no
meaningful distinction between disclosing an out-of-court statement so that the factfinder
may evaluate the expert's opinion and disclosing that statement for its truth." 122In a
footnote, he asserted that "the purportedly 'limited reason' for such testimony-to aid the
factfinder in evaluating the expert's opinion-necessarily entails an evaluation of whether
the basis testimony is true."123 As support for his position, Justice Thomas quoted the
following passage from the expert testimony text coauthored by Professors Kaye,
Bernstein, and Mnookin:
To use the inadmissible information in evaluating the expert's
testimony, the jury must make a preliminary judgment whether this
information is true. If the jury believes that the basis evidence is true, it
will likely also believe the expert's reliance is justified; inversely, if the
jury doubts the accuracy or validity of the basis evidence, it will be
skeptical of the expert's conclusions.124
Justice Thomas ultimately concluded that "basis testimony is admitted for its
truth"12 rather than a 'legitimate' nonhearsay purpose . . . ."126

As previously stated, in his lead opinion Justice Alito conceded that the falsity of
the facts mentioned in secondhand reports can sometimes render the opinion irrelevant.127
Even in those cases, however, Justice Alito apparently contemplated that the judge would
go no farther than delivering jury instructions assigning the relevance or weight
determination to the jury; he did not raise the possibility of excluding the opinion itself. 128
In his concurrence, Justice Thomas did not reach the question of whether the judge should
bar the opinion itself when the evidentiary record does not contain independent,
admissible evidence of the facts mentioned in the secondhand reports the expert relies
01.129

117 Id. at 2259-61 (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment) (quoting Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 836-37, 40
(2006) (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part)).

. Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 310-312 (2009).
Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705, 2717 (2011).
Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2255. (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment).
121 Id. at
2256.
122 Id. at 2257 (Thomas J., concurring
in judgment).
119
120

Id. at 2257 n.1.
Id. at 2257 (quoting KAYE ET AL., supra note 48, at 196.
125 Id. at 2258.
126 Id. at 2258 n.4 (quoting Tennessee v. Street,
471 U.S. 409, 417 (1985)).
127 Id. at 2241 (plurality
opinion).
123

124

128

id

129

Id. at 2258 (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment) (discussing out-of-court statements relied on by the expert).
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Justice Kagan's Dissenting Opinion

While disagreeing with Justice Thomas's characterization of the Cellmark report
as nontestimonial, the dissenters agreed with his rejection of the plurality's contention that
the reference to the Cellmark report had been used for a nonhearsay purpose.130 The
dissent advances two different arguments as bases for rejecting the plurality's
contention.131 One argument is that it is unrealistic to believe that the jury will be willing
and able to follow a limiting instruction precluding the jury's substantive use of the
secondhand report.132 Citing the Kaye text, the dissent dismisses that belief as "factually
implausible" and "sheer fiction."133 The dissent then makes the alternative argument that
"'as a simple matter of logic,"134 it is "nonsense"135 to believe that the secondhand report
can be used for a nonsubstantive, nonhearsay purpose.136 Just as Justice Thomas professed
that he could find no "meaningful distinction" between the hearsay and purported
nonhearsay uses of secondhand reports under Rule 703, the dissenters quoted People v.
137
Goldstein,
a 2005 New York decision, to the effect that "[t]he distinction between a
statement offered for its truth and a statement offered to shed light on an expert's opinion
is not meaningful." 13 On the facts of the case, the dissent felt that "the only way the
factfinder could consider whether [Cellmark's] statement supported her opinion (that
the
13 9
DNA on L.J.'s swabs came from Williams) was by assessing the statement's truth."
There is a further parallel between the dissent and Justice Thomas's concurrence.
As previously stated, Justice Thomas stopped short of discussing the implications of his
conclusion that secondhand reports under Rule 703 are necessarily used for the hearsay
purpose of proving the truth of the report. In particular, Justice Thomas did not discuss the
nature of the judge's authority to admit or exclude an expert opinion when the record is
devoid of independent, admissible evidence establishing the truth of a secondhand report
that forms an essential premise of the opinion. Likewise, the dissent avoided discussing
the implications of its conclusion that secondhand reports are used for hearsay purposes.
In the context of Williams, the failure to reach that issue is understandable. Although he
found that the statement had been used for its truth, Justice Thomas was able to moot the
703 hearsay issue by focusing his analysis on the formality requirement for testimonial
statements.140 In the case of the dissenting justices, their rejection of the plurality's 703
argument led them directly to the testimonial issue, which is where they parted company
with Justice Thomas. 141
The rub is that in Williams five Supreme Court justices clearly expressed the
view that, in order to be used under Rule 703, a secondhand report must be put to a
hearsay purpose.142 In the procedural setting, neither Justice Thomas nor Justice Kagan
130 Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2272 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2268-70.
132

id

133

Id. at 2269 (quoting KAYE ET AL., supra note 48, at 196.)
Id. at 2271.

34

1

131

Id. at 2269.

136 Id.

People v. Goldstein, 843 N.E.2d 727, 732-33 (N.Y. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 2293 (2006).
138 Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2269 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (quoting People v. Goldstein,
843 N.E.2d 727, 732-33
(N.Y. 2005)).
139 Id. at 2271.
137

140
141
142

Id. at 2260-63 (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment).
Id. at 2265 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2226 (plurality opinion).
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found it necessary to explore the implications of that view. However, since a majority of
the Court's members has stated that view, it will now be on the mind of many lower court
judges who must apply Rule 703 in post-Williams cases.143 What are the implications of
that view? What are the stakes involved in the dispute between the Rule 703 majority and
the plurality? The two remaining parts of this article turn to those issues.

III.

THE STAKES INVOLVED IN THE DISPUTE OVER THE EVIDENTIARY STATUS OF
SECONDHAND REPORTS USED UNDER RULE 703

In his plurality opinion, Justice Alito acknowledges that at least in some
circumstances the falsity of a secondhand report used under Rule 703 can render the
opinion irrelevant. 1 He does not seem to believe, however, that the lack or insufficiency
of independent, admissible evidence of the fact mentioned in the report calls into question
the admissibility of the opinion itself. 1 Rather, he apparently views the problem as one of
the weight of the opinion.146 As previously stated, near the end of his opinion he asserts
that "the trial judges may and, under most circumstances, must instruct the jury that . .. an
expert's opinion is only as good as the independent evidence that establishes its
underlying premises." 1 He specifically discusses the extreme fact situation in which the
proponent "cannot muster any independent admissible evidence to prove the foundational
facts that are essential to the relevance of the expert's testimony .... " In addressing
that situation, he does not even mention the possibility of outright judicial exclusion of the
opinion. Rather, he states that in such a circumstance, "the expert's testimony cannot be
given any weight by the trier of fact."149 In that circumstance, the trial judge would
presumably give an instruction like the Forsyth jury charge that Justice Alito approvingly
quoted earlier in his opinion: "If the [facts mentioned in the secondhand reports] are not
supported by [independent] proof, then the answers to the questions are entitled to no
weight ....
As noted in subparts II.B and II.C, unlike Justice Alito, Justice Thomas and
Justice Kagan do not explore the consequences of their conclusion that the secondhand
report about the Cellmark test had to be admitted for its truth; after reaching that
conclusion, both justices immediately segue to their analysis of the Sixth Amendment
Confrontation Clause issue in Williams.1 5 1 Yet the obvious, unanswered question is:
Where does the logic of their position lead? Their position could lead to the conclusion
that the lack or insufficiency of admissible evidence of the fact mentioned in the
secondhand report poses an admissibility problem, not merely a weight problem. There is
certainly a plausible argument that if (1) secondhand reports are necessarily admitted for
the truth of the report, (2) the falsity of the reports renders the opinion irrelevant, and (3)
in a given case there is either no admissible evidence or insufficient admissible evidence
of the truth of the fact mentioned in the secondhand report, the opinion itself should be
excluded. The proper enforcement mechanism would arguably be a judicial ruling

143
144

See, e.g., State v. Nararette, 81 U.S.L.W. 1068 (N.M. Sup. Ct. Jan. 17, 2013).
Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2238 (Kagan, J., dissenting).

146

Id. at 2239.
Id. at 2237.

147

Id. at 2241.

148

id

145

149 id

"'Id. at 2234.
...
Id. at 2259, 2272.
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excluding the opinion, not the weaker measure of a Forsyth-style judicial instruction
telling the jury to assign the opinion "no weight." 1 5 2
Ultimately, the position taken by the 703 majority in Williams could lead to the
abolition of many of the procedural distinctions between hypothetical questions and
153
questions based on secondhand reports used under Rule 703.
As subpart I.A explained,
in the case of hypothetical questions, before posing the question to the expert the
proponent must ordinarily present independent, admissible evidence of every fact included
in the hypothesis. 1 54 If the proponent neglects to do so, the judge bars the question and
prevents the jury's exposure to the opinion.1 5 5 In contrast, if the proponent opts for an
opinion based on secondhand reports under Rule 703 rather than a hypothetical question,
the judge does not impose the condition precedent that the proponent submit independent,
admissible evidence of the fact mentioned in the report.156 At most, as Justice Alito's
opinion indicates, the judge instructs the jury that they should consider the lack of
15 7
independent evidence of the fact in deciding how much weight to ascribe to the opinion.
However, if the 703 majority's position is sound, at first blush the differential treatment of
hypothetical questions and questions based on secondhand reports seems indefensible. The
position strongly implies that if the presentation of admissible evidence aliunde is a
condition precedent to posing the hypothetical question, the judge should impose the same
condition in the case of questions resting on secondhand reports under Rule 703.

IV.

A CRITICAL EVALUATION OF THE MERITS OF THE DISPUTE OVER THE
EVIDENTIARY STATUS OF SECONDHAND REPORTS USED UNDER RULE 703

We now turn to the merits of the dispute over the evidentiary status of
secondhand reports. We shall evaluate the dispute from two perspectives. Initially, we
shall consider whether, as a matter of logic, the plurality or the 703 majority has the better
argument. Then we shall analyze the issue as a problem of statutory construction.
A.

The Logic of the Use of a Secondhand Report as a Basis for an
Expert Opinion

A dissection of the logic of using secondhand reports poses several subissues:
1.

Nonhearsay Uses of Secondhand Reports

Can a secondhand report that is used as the basis for an expert opinion ever
possess legitimate, nonhearsay logical relevance?
Both Justices Thomas and Kagan believe that whenever an expert relies on a
secondhand report as the basis for an opinion, the contents of the report are necessarily
being put to a hearsay, substantive use.15" As subpart III.C noted, when Congress enacted
the Federal Rules, most jurisdictions in the common law world were of the same mind.15 9

152

Id. at 2234.

153

Id. at 2239.

154

Id. at 2241.

SId.
156
157
151

Id. at 2228.
Id. at 2240.
Id. at 2259, 2272.

I. Imwinkelried, A ComparativistCritique of the Interface Between Hearsayand Expert
Opinion in American Evidence Law, 33 B.C. L. REV. 1, 24-29, 34 (1991).
159 Id. at 2239; Edward
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That view, however, was not universal throughout the common law world. 160
One English commentator, Keane, took the position that when secondhand reports serve
as the basis for an expert opinion, the reports have "no hearsay quality."16 A Canadian
evidence scholar, McWilliams, agreed that so long as the judge gives the jury a "careful"
instruction specifying the proper use of the report, the report is not subject to a hearsay
objection.162 In short, just as the plurality and the 703 majority disagree in Williams,163 the
authorities in other countries are divided over the evidentiary status of secondhand reports.
The question recurs: Can such reports possess legitimate nonhearsay logical
relevance? The answer is Yes. Justice Alito's opinion suggests two examples. 1 6 4

.

In one passage, Justice Alito states that a secondhand report possesses plausible
nonhearsay relevance to the question of whether "the expert's reasoning was . .
logical."165 The justice explains that the factfinder's consideration of the secondhand
report can help the factfinder assess the quality of "the expert's thought process."166 By
reviewing the secondhand reports mentioned by the expert and the manner in which the
expert processed the reports, the factfinder can determine whether the expert committed
any evident logical fallacies in reasoning to his or her opinion.167 The factfinder can make
that determination regardless of the truth of the secondhand report. 16 Putting aside the
question of the truth of the report, the factfinder's consideration of the report for this
purpose can give the factfinder some insight into the caliber of the expert's reasoning.169
Even if the secondhand report is false, a consideration of the report can help the jury
decide whether the expert correctly connected the dots in his or her reasoning. 170

In another passage, Justice Alito indicates that the factfinder's consideration of
the secondhand reports can aid the factfinder in deciding whether "the expert drew an
unwarranted inference from the premises on which the expert relied." 17 1 The factfinder
can review all the secondhand reports cited by the expert and inquire whether,
cumulatively, they have adequate probative value to support the inference the expert
proposes drawing.172 Considered together, do the secondhand reports furnish sufficient
warrant for the expert's claim? Do the reports justify the proposed inference, or is the
expert overstating the conclusion that can be drawn from the premises? Once again the
factfinder can put the report to this use regardless of its truth.
This second use of secondhand reports brings a traditional nonhearsay use of outof-court statements-mental input-into play. Under the mental input theory of logical
relevance, the trial judge admits the statement for the limited purpose of showing its effect

160

Imwinkelried, supra note 159, at 23-24.

161

ADRIAN KEANE, THE MODERN LAW OF EVIDENCE 369-70 (2d ed.
1989).

162

PETER K. MCWILLIAMS, CANADIAN CRIMINAL EVIDENCE 251 (2d ed.
1984).

163

132 S.C t. at 2239.

164

Id. 2240.

165

Id.

166

Id.
ROBERT J. KREYCHE, LOGIC FOR UNDERGRADUATES Ch. 2-3 (3d ed. 1970) (listing the fallacies of

16'

equivocation, amphiboly, composition and division, accent, accident, special case, ignoring the issue, begging
the question, and complex question).
16

Id.

169

id
id.

170

171
172

132 S. Ct at 2240.
id
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on the state of mind of the hearer or reader.173 Suppose, for example, that a plaintiff sued a
police officer for false arrest. Under the law of the jurisdiction, the officer is not liable if
she based the arrest on a reasonable, albeit mistaken, belief that the defendant had
committed a crime. At trial, the officer attempts to testify that before she arrested the
plaintiff, a third party told her that he had just observed the plaintiff selling cocaine. Even
if the third party's report to the officer is false, the officer's receipt of the report can
produce in her mind an honest, reasonable belief that the plaintiff had perpetrated a felony.
Under Rule 105, the trial judge would give the jury a limiting instruction that although
they could not treat the report as substantive evidence that the plaintiff sold cocaine, they
may consider the report in evaluating the honesty and reasonableness of the officer's

belief. 17
By the same token, an expert's receipt of a secondhand report can help establish
the reasonableness of the expert's thought process. 175 The jury is surely entitled to inquire
whether, on its face, the expert's analytic process is reasonable. The more secondhand
data the expert receives, the better grounded the opinion will be. In footnote 3 in his
concurrence, Justice Thomas dismisses the application of the mental input theory.176
However, he considers one variation of the mental input theory: offering the secondhand
report of the Cellmark finding "to explain what prompted [Ms. Lambatos] to search the
DNA database for a match." 17 7 He is correct in concluding that use of the evidence in this
way would not necessitate disclosing the details that Cellmark had found a male DNA
profile in the semen from L.J.'s vaginal swabs.17 " But using the report to explain the
recipient's subsequent conduct is only one variation of the mental input theory. As the
preceding paragraph demonstrates, the report could also be used to show the honesty and
reasonableness of the recipient's state of mind. A proponent offering a secondhand report
to establish the reasonableness of an expert's thought process is invoking a variation of the
mental input theory. The trial judge may permit a reference to the report for that
nonhearsay purpose and give the jury a limiting instruction specifying that purpose. 179
2.

Hearsay Uses of Secondhand Reports

Even if the secondhand report possesses nonhearsay logical relevance, is it
realistic to think that the lay jurors will be able and willing to follow the limiting
instruction? Or are they likely to disregard the instruction, misuse the evidence for a
hearsay purpose, and treat the report as substantive evidence of the fact mentioned in the
report?
In many instances, a single item of evidence is logically relevant to the facts on
multiple theories.'s In the preceding discussion, we saw that secondhand reports can
sometimes be logically relevant on a nonhearsay theory for the purpose of helping the
factfinder evaluate the quality of the expert's reasoning. However, the same report may be
relevant for a hearsay purpose as well. Suppose, for example, that a testifying physician
relies on a nurse's secondhand report about the plaintiff patient's symptoms. It is clear that
the Advisory Committee contemplated Rule 703's application to such reports. 8 The
173EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIEDET AL., COURTROOM CRIMINAL EVIDENCE § 1004, at 10-17-24
(5thed. 2011).
174 Id.
171
176

Imwinkelried, supra note 159, at 14.
132 S. Ct. at 2258 n.3 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment).

177 Id.
178 Id.
179

IMWINKELRIED ET AL., supranote 173

§ 1004,

at 10-17-24.

"s DAVID P. LEONARD, THE NEW WIGMORE: SELECTED RULES OF LIMITED ADMISSIBILITY

§

1.4, (2002).

. FED. R. EvID. 703 advisory committee's note (reports and opinions from nurses).
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nurse's report, however, could also be logically relevant as substantive evidence on the
issue of the plaintiff's damages. The rub is that although relevant to damages, the nurse's
report could be inadmissible for that purpose because it might not fall within any hearsay
exception.182 In these dual relevance fact situations when an item of evidence is admissible
for one purpose but not for another, the common law solution has been to admit the
evidence but to require1 84a limiting instruction.183 Federal Rule of Evidence 105 continues
the traditional practice.
Because the hearing in Williams was a bench trial, there was minimal risk that
any secondhand report would be misused. 1 5 The risk of misuse is much greater when the
factfinder is a jury of laypersons. In the 1980s Professor Rice asserted that it is an absurd
fiction that the jurors can and will comply with the limiting instruction in this setting.186
More recently, in their text on scientific evidence, Professors Kaye, Bernstein, and
Mnookin state that it is "highly unlikely that juries are capable of such mental
gymnastics." 1 If the jurors disregard the limiting instruction, Rule 703 becomes a
backdoor hearsay exception that admits the secondhand report as substantive evidence. 8
Evidence scholars are not the only commentators who have expressed skepticism
about the jurors' compliance with the limiting instruction. To begin with, as Professors
Kaye, Bernstein, and Mnookin point out, there is an extensive body of psychological
research indicating that in some circumstances, lay jurors are likely to ignore limiting
instructions, including instructions about the limited evidentiary status of secondhand
reports.18 9 A number of courts have voiced the same skepticism. 190 On the particular facts
of specific cases, the United States Supreme Court has occasionally held that it was
unrealistic to believe that a limiting or curative instruction to disregard would be
effective. 191 Indeed, as amended in 2000, Rule 703 itself reflects an awareness of this
danger. In that year, the rule was amended to codify a presumptive rule that the expert
may not go into detail elaborating the content of an otherwise inadmissible secondhand
report.192 The Advisory Committee Note accompanying the amendment mentions the
danger of "the jury's potential misuse of the information as substantive evidence."193 The
182

Cf FED. R. EvID. 803(4) (exception to the rule against hearsay: statement made for medical diagnosis or

treatment).
183 LEONARD, supra note 180 § 1.4. For instance, with a limiting instruction, a judge might admit an accused's
prior conviction for impeachment under Rule 609 but bar its use as bad character evidence on the historical
merits under Rules 404-05. Likewise, ajudge could permit the introduction of evidence of an accused's prior
crime on a noncharacter theory to show motive under Rule 404(b) but preclude the prosecution from treating the
act as evidence of the accused's general bad character under Rule 404(a).
184 Id. §
1.5.
185

Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2222, 2242.

186

Rice, supra note 48, at 585.

187

KAYE ET AL., supra note 48

EVIDENCE

§ 4:8,

§

3.7.2; see also BARBARA & NANCY HOLLANDER, WHARTON'S CRIMINAL

(15th ed. 2012).

3 FederalRules ofEvidence Manual, § 703.2[4] (Matthew Bender 10th ed.).
189 KAYE ET AL., supra note 48

§ 3.7.2,

at n. 37 (2004).

190

E.g., People v. Coleman, 695 P.2d 189 (Cal. 1985).

191

RONALD L. CARLSON & EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, DYNAMICS OF TRIAL PRACTICE: PROBLEMS AND

MATERIALS § 15.3(A), at 439-41 (4th ed. 2010) (discussing Shepard v. United States, 290 U.S. 96 (1933),
Jacksonv. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964), and Brutonv. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968)).
192 The last sentence of restyled Rule 703 now provides: "But if the facts
or data would otherwise be
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Note counsels trial judges to "consider the probable effectiveness or lack of effectiveness
of a limiting instruction under the particular circumstances." 1 9 4
This line of argument is not so much an attack on Rule 703 as it is a plea for the
more frequent invocation of Rule 403. In general terms, Rule 403 allows trial judges to
exclude otherwise inadmissible evidence when they believe that the attendant probative
dangers such as unfair prejudice substantially outstrip the probative worth of the
evidence.195 The Advisory Committee Note to Rule 403 explains that unfair prejudice
includes the danger that the jury will decide the case on an improper basis. 19 More to the
point, the Note indicates that the risk of unfair prejudice arises when evidence is
admissible only for a limited purpose but the judge believes that the jury will misuse the
evidence for another, inadmissible purpose.197 When a juror misuses the item of evidence
and that misuse influences the juror's vote, the misuse can prompt a verdict on an
improper basis. Given the right facts and the psychological research into the efficacy of
limiting instructions, trial judges should be more receptive to the argument that Rule 403
trumps Rule 703 in a given case because there is an intolerable risk that the jury will
ignore the limiting instruction. However, the Supreme Court has rarely found such an
intolerable risk.198 Typically, the Court has done so only when a "perfect storm" created
the risk: The out-of-court statement was directly relevant to a critical issue in the case, the
declarant presumably had personal knowledge of the fact asserted, and the declarant was a
key player in the case-the accused himself or herself, a co-conspirator, or the named
victim.199 In many cases, secondhand reports used under Rule 703 will lack one or more of
these characteristics: The report might not bear directly on a vital issue in the case, it may
be doubtful whether the declarant possessed firsthand knowledge, or the declarant may
have only a minor role in the transaction. Perhaps trial judges should accept such Rule 403
arguments more often, but this line of argument does not undermine Rule 703 itself. In
contrast, the next argument represents a more formidable, fundamental challenge to Rule
703.
Even if the secondhand report possesses nonhearsay logical relevance, does the
factfinder have to put the report to hearsay use and treat it as substantive evidence of the
truth of the report in order to make an intelligent decision whether to accept the opinion
based on the report?
The attack discussed above rests on a prediction that in some cases jurors will
disregard the limiting instruction and put the report to a substantive, hearsay use. In the
final analysis that attack sounds in Rule 403 rather than Rule 703. The next argument,
however, rests on logic rather than a prediction of juror behavior. According to this
argument, in every case the factfinder must put the report to a substantive, hearsay use in
order to decide whether the opinion is relevant and should be accepted.20 The thrust of the
argument is that as a matter of logic, the secondhand report must always be used for that
purpose; if the fact mentioned in the report is essential to the validity of the opinion and
there is no sufficient admissible evidence of the truth of the fact, the opinion is irrelevant

194

id

195

FED. R. EvID. 403.

196

FED. R. EvID. 403 advisory committee's note.

Id. (Specifically: "In reaching a decision whether to exclude on grounds of unfair prejudice, consideration
should be given to the probable effectiveness or lack of effectiveness of a limiting instruction.").
197
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United States v. Martinez, 939 F.2d 412, 414-415 (7th Cir. 1991).

199 CARLSON& IMWINKELRIED, supra note 191 § 15.3, at 441.
200 Ian Volek, FederalRuleofEvidence 703: The Back Door and the ConfrontationClause, Ten Years Later, 80
FORDHAML. REv. 959, 977-8 (2011).
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and should be excluded.2 0 1
A number of respected commentators subscribe to this line of argument.202 They
contend that it is "logically incoherent" to admit the opinion absent admissible evidence of
the truth of its premises.203 The validity and relevance of the opinion necessarily depend
on the truth of its premises.204 Absent such evidence of the truth of the premises, the
205

opinion is unsubstantiated and irrelevant.
If sufficient admissible evidence supporting
the opinion's premises is not available, it is illogical to admit the opinion as substantive
206
evidence in the case.
It is fallacious for the factfinder to accept the truth of the opinion
absent admissible proof of the truth of the premises.207 Some courts have embraced this
argument20 and, as previously stated, even Justice Alito acknowledged in Williams that
the falsity of the premise of the truth of Cellmark's report would render Ms. Lambatos's
opinion irrelevant.2 0 9
As a generalization, this line of argument is correct. When a conclusion or
opinion rests on certain premises, the opinion is conditional in nature.210 When a
conclusion is said to be conditional on a certain fact, the validity of the conclusion is
contingent on the truth of the condition.211 That understanding of the nature of a condition
is pervasive in the law. For example, Contracts law treats the concept of a condition in that
manner.212 The Federal Rules of Evidence also reflect the concept of conditional
validity.2 1 3 If the validity of an opinion is conditional upon the truth of a certain premise, a
decision maker cannot accept the opinion as valid unless and until the premise is proven to
be true.
There is an important qualification, though, to this generalization: The
generalization holds true only when the premise essential to the conclusion. In some
instances a secondhand report used under Rule 703 lends further support to the expert's
opinion but the fact mentioned in the report is not an essential premise. Consider, for
example, a defense psychiatrist's opinion that a person is suffering from a certain mental
disorder. The disorder is one of the illnesses for which there are Feigner inclusionary
214
criteria.
Assume that the American Psychiatric Association's Diagnosticand Statistical
Manual (DSM) IV-TR states that there are four classic symptoms of the disorder and that
before diagnosing a subject as suffering from the disorder, the psychiatrist must find that

201
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KAYE ET AL., supra note 48 § 4.7.2, at 178-81; Charles Alan Wright et al., 29 FED. PRAC. & PROC. EVIDENCE
§ 6272 (1997); Rice, supra note 48, at 585.
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KAYE ET AL., supra note 48, at 179.
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Rice, supra note 48, at 585.
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KAYE ET AL., supra note 48, at 179.
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Wright et al., supra note 202, at 320.
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KAYEET AL., supra note 48, at 179; Rice, supra note 48, at 585.
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208 See, e.g., People v. Goldstein, 6 N.Y.3d 119, 127 (2005) (the court did not see
how a factfinder could accept
an opinion "without accepting [the] premise . . . that the statements were true . .
209 Williams, 132 S. Ct. 2221, 2238 (2012).
210 Edward J. Imwinkelried, A ComparativistCritique of the Interface Between Hearsayand Expert
Opinion in

American Evidence Law, 33 B.C. L. REV. 1, 33 (1991).
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Black's Law Dictionary 293 ( th ed. 1990).
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the subject's case history includes at least three of the four symptoms.2 The psychiatrist
is prepared to testify that the accused suffers from the disorder and that the basis for her
opinion consists of 703 secondhand reports about all four symptoms. Suppose further that
while the record contains independent, admissible evidence of three symptoms, there is no
such evidence of the fourth. In these circumstances, the prosecution could attack the
weight of the psychiatrist's opinion by pointing to the absence of admissible evidence of
the fourth symptom. However, since the diagnostic criteria require a finding of only three
symptoms, the lack of admissible evidence of the fourth symptom would not render the
opinion irrelevant; even if the fourth symptom is absent, there is an adequate basis for the
opinion. The absence of independent evidence of the fourth symptom would not make it
illogical for the factfinder to accept the psychiatrist's opinion.
Vary the hypothetical. Assume that there is either no evidence or insufficient
independent evidence of both the third and fourth symptoms or that the factfinder rejects
the evidence of the existence of the third or fourth symptoms. Now the state of the
evidentiary record undercuts an essential premise of the opinion; ex hypothesi only two of
the three necessary symptoms are present in the accused's case history. Given these
assumptions, the opinion is irrelevant and it would be illogical for the factfinder to
embrace the opinion. Simply stated, the falsity of a truly essential premise216 invalidates
the expert's conditional opinion.
3.

The Allocation of the Factfinding Responsibility Between the Judge
and Jury with Respect to Secondhand Reports

Does the fact that the falsity of an essential premise of a conditional opinion
renders the opinion irrelevant dictate the conclusion that the trial judge should be assigned
the task of deciding the truth of the premise and empowered to exclude the opinion
whenever he or she would conclude that the essential premise is false? Or is jury is
generally competent to perform that task?
As we have seen, the falsity of an essential premise of an opinion can render the
opinion irrelevant; if an essential premise of an opinion is false, it is illogical for the
factfinder to accept the opinion as true. That analysis, however, does not dictate the
conclusion that in all cases the trial judge should be authorized to decide whether an
essential premise is false and, if so, bar the opinion. The basic question is one of the
217
allocation of factfinding responsibility between the judge and jury.
In several cases, the common law of Evidence and the Federal Rules assign to the
jury the responsibility of deciding facts which determine the logical relevance of an item
2181
of evidence.
Concededly, the trial judge usually resolves factual questions that
determine the admissibility of evidence.219 Federal Rule of Evidence 104(a) recognizes
this practice.220 For example, suppose that an opponent makes a hearsay objection to
testimony about an out-of-court statement offered as an excited utterance under Federal
215

AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL
OF MENTAL DISORDERS: DSM-IV-TR,

(4th ed. text revision 2010).
216 In the analogous context of hypothetical questions, the trial judge has authority
to bar the question when the
judge believes that the hypothesis omits an essential premise. The judge determines whether the hypothesis
furnishes "an adequate basis" for the expert's opinion. KENNETH BROUN ET AL., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE

§

14, at 90 (6th ed. 2006).
217 Rice, supra note 48,
at 588.
218 See generally Edward J. Imwinkelried, DeterminingPreliminaryFacts Under FederalRule 104, 45 AM. JUR.
Trials 1, § 33 (1992).
219

FED. R. EvID. 104(a).
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Rule 803(2).22 The trial judge decides the foundational question of whether the declarant
was in a state of nervous excitement at the time of the statement. Similarly, assume that an
opponent objects to a question on the ground that the question calls for the disclosure of a
communication protected by the attorney -client privilege under Federal Rule 501.222 These
issues fall into the category of foundational or preliminary facts conditioning the
.1
223
The judge decides the question of the existence or truth of
"competence" of evidence.
these facts.
However, there is another category of foundational facts-those conditioning the
224
logical relevance of evidence.
This category includes such foundational facts as a lay
witness's possession of personal knowledge225 under Rule 602 and the authenticity of
exhibits226 under Rule 901.227 Federal Rule of Evidence 104(b) codifies the conditional
relevance doctrine: "When the [logical] relevance of evidence depends on whether a fact
exists, proof must be introduced sufficient to support a finding that the fact does exist. The
court may admit the proposed evidence on the condition that the proof be introduced
later." 2 2 8
When a fact falls under Rule 104(b), the trial judge plays a limited, screening
role.229 Rather than passing on the credibility of the proponent's foundational testimony,
the trial judge accepts the testimony at face value.230 The judge then conducts a limited
inquiry: If the jury chooses to believe the foundational testimony, does the testimony have
sufficient probative value to support a rational, permissive inference of the existence of
the foundational fact such as, for instance, the fact that the witness saw the accident or the
plaintiff actually authored the letter?231 Assume the trial judge ruled that there was
sufficient evidence. The trial judge would then allow the lay witness to testify about the
accident or permit the letter's proponent to submit it to the jury. In the final jury charge,
the judge would instruct the jurors that they have to decide the issue of whether the lay
witness possessed firsthand knowledge of the accident or whether the plaintiff signed the
232
letter. More specifically, the trial judge tells the jurors that:

221
222
223

2 24

225
226

*

If they find that the preliminary fact is true, they may consider the lay
witness's testimony or the exhibit during the balance of their deliberations.

*

However, if they find that the preliminary fact is false, they should
233
completely disregard the testimony and exhibit during their deliberations.

Imwinkelried, supra note 218, at § 50.
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§

133 (5th ed. 2011).

Id. § 134.
Imwinkelried, supra note 218, at § 10.
Id. § 20-22.
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FED. R. EvID. 104(b).
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Id. § 31.
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Federal Rules of Evidence 602 and 901 make it clear that the conditional
relevance doctrine governs the preliminary facts of a lay witness's personal knowledge
234
and an exhibit's authenticity.
For its part, Rule 602 states that a lay witness may testify
about a fact or event "if evidence is introduced sufficient to support a finding that the
witness has personal knowledge of the matter." 23 Rule 901(a) adds that in the case of
exhibits such as letters, "the proponent must produce evidence sufficient to support a
finding that the item is what the proponent claims it to be."2 36
Why treat these preliminary facts differently than the run-of-the-mill preliminary
facts that fall under Rule 104(a) and that are assigned to the trial judge? The title of the
231
doctrine codified in Rule 104(b), "conditional relevance," is suggestive.
Suppose that at
the outset of their deliberations, the jurors decide that the lay witness called by the
plaintiff does not have personal knowledge of the accident he testified about; they are
convinced that the witness is lying or mistaken. On that supposition, common sense will
naturally lead the jury to disregard the witness's testimony during the remainder of its
deliberations. The jurors have literally decided that this witness "doesn't know what he's
talking about." This is a common sense notion, not a technical legal doctrine. The
justification for classifying the authenticity of exhibits as falling under Rule 104(b) is
similar.238 Assume that, at the beginning of their deliberations, the jurors decide that the
letter purportedly signed by the plaintiff is a forgery. Again, they should have no difficulty
putting aside the letter for the remainder of their deliberations. Here they have decided that
the letter "isn't worth the paper it's written on." Foundational facts are categorized under
104(b) when they condition the logical relevance of the evidence in such a fundamental
sense that even lay jurors without legal training will see that the falsity of the fact renders
the evidence irrelevant.239 For that reason, we trust the jury to make the ultimate
determination whether the witness has firsthand knowledge or whether the exhibit is
authentic. If the jurors decide that the preliminary fact is false, their prior exposure to the
witness's testimony or the letter is unlikely to taint the remainder of their deliberations;
once they decide that the preliminary fact is false, they will view the evidence as irrelevant
and worthless. They should be perfectly capable of putting the testimony out of mind.
There is a strong analogy between these "conditional relevance" preliminary
facts and the question of the truth of the essential premises for an expert opinion. If a lay
witness lacks personal knowledge of the accident he proposes to testify about, his lack of
firsthand knowledge renders his testimony irrelevant. Again, if an exhibit is not genuine,
its inauthenticity renders the exhibit irrelevant and patently worthless. Similarly, when an
essential premise of an expert opinion is false, its falsity renders the opinion irrelevant.
The question is whether we can generally trust the jury to determine the falsity of
the essential premise. The bottom line issue is whether we can be confident that the jurors
can and will disregard the expert's opinion if they conclude that an essential premise is
false. That does not seem to be too much to ask of lay jurors. Any reasonably intelligent
person can understand this common sense argument: A (the opinion) is true only if B (the
essential premise) is true; B is false; ergo, A is false. One does not need a college degree,
234

David S. Schwartz,A Foundation Theory ofEvidence, 100 GEOL.J. 95, 100 (2011).
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§ 134 (5th ed. 2011).
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much less a J.D. or a B.S., to realize that the conclusion follows inexorably from the
premises. We can therefore safely entrust the decision to the jury.2 4 0
Admittedly, Federal Rule 104(a)'s competence procedure governs some of the
foundational facts conditioning the admissibility of expert opinions.241 For example, in the
majority opinion in the celebrated Daubert decision, Justice Blackmun explicitly stated
that 104(a) controls the judge's determination whether the theory or technique the expert
proposes employing has been validated by adequate, methodologically sound empirical
242
reasoning and data.
However, the admissibility of a single item of evidence is often
conditioned on multiple preliminary facts, some falling under 104(a) and others under
243
104(b).
For example, suppose that a defense counsel offers a conviction to impeach a
prosecution witness. Under Federal Rule of Evidence 609(c), the trial judge determines
whether the conviction is inadmissible because the witness has been pardoned for the prior
244
crime.
However, the conviction is obviously irrelevant and inadmissible for the purpose
of impeaching this witness unless the witness is the person who suffered the conviction.24 5
The determination of the witness's identity as the convict falls under Rule 104(b). 246 Thus,
it is quite possible to assign the jury the task of determining the sufficiency of the
admissible evidence of the facts mentioned in the secondhand reports under Rule 703 even
though the trial judge has the determinative vote on many of the other facets of the
admissibility of the expert's opinion.
If the jury can be assigned this task, the approach outlined in Justice Alito's
plurality opinion is generally satisfactory. In the typical case, rather than personally
deciding whether the opinion's essential premises are true, the judge instructs the jurors
that they have that task; they are to weigh the independent, admissible evidence of the fact
stated in the secondhand report to decide whether that fact is true. Moreover, as in
Forsyth, the judge bluntly tells the jurors that if they find that one of the opinion's
essential premises is false, they must give the opinion "no weight." 2 4 7
What about the exceptional situation in which the expert's proponent fails to
present sufficient independent evidence of the truth of the facts stated in the secondhand
reports used under Rule 703? In that situation, does logic dictate that the opinion is
irrelevant and the trial judge should bar the proponent from submitting the opinion to the

jury?
The previous paragraphs developed a parallel to Federal Rule of Evidence
104(b).248 That statute assigns the ultimate conditional relevance determination to the jury.
By its terms, however, the statute also prescribes that the trial judge must submit that
Ia a given case, it might be tenable to argue that under Rules 403 and 6 11(a) the trial judge is authorized to
deviate from the normal rule allocating the responsibility to the jury. Suppose, for example, that the foundational
testimony about the scientific evidence consumed hours of courtroom time and hundreds of pages of transcript.
"Understandably, when jurors listen to hours of foundational scientific testimony, they [may] have difficulty
ignoring the proof during their deliberations [even after] they find that" the opinion is inadmissible.
Imwinkelried, supra note 239, at 605. That argument is plausible when the jury realizes that the evidence is
being excluded for a technical legal reason. The argument carries less weight in a setting such as here in which
the jury has decided that the opinion is irrelevant.
241 Imwinkelried, supra
note 231, at § 47.
242 Daubertv. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc.,
509 U.S. 579, 593 (1993).
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supra note 231, at § 47.
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609(c).
245 Id. at advisory committee's note
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ultimate decision to the jury only when the proponent has "introduced [proof] sufficient to
support a finding [by the jury] that the fact does exist." 24 Rule 602's restatement of the
standard is explicit; according to Rule 602, the judge must permit the jury to make the
final decision "only if evidence is introduced sufficient to support a finding that the
witness has personal knowledge of the matter."250 Suppose that after reviewing the record,
the judge concludes either that the proponent has presented no evidence of the fact or that,
as a matter of law, the proponent's evidence is insufficient to support a rational inference.
In that situation, the judge makes a peremptory ruling, never submits the question to the
jury, and excludes the evidence. In that state of the record the jury could not make a
rational finding that the witness possessed firsthand knowledge; to regulate the rationality
of the verdict, the judge bars the testimony.
Consider a parallel situation involving secondhand reports. Assume that after
reviewing the state of the record at the time the proponent proffers the opinion, the judge
concludes that there is no admissible evidence of the fact stated in an essential secondhand
report or that the independent evidence is too flimsy to sustain a rational inference. Even if
the jurors chose to believe the independent evidence, they could not find the essential
premise to be true. As under Rule 104(b), the state of the record calls out for the judge to
make a peremptory ruling and exclude the expert opinion.251 It makes no sense to expose
the jury to the opinion when it is clear that it would be irrational for the jury to find the
existence of one or more of the essential premises of the opinion. It would hardly enhance
the integrity of the factfinding process to give the jury an opportunity to make an
undeniably irrational decision.
B.

The Legislation Governing the Use of a Secondhand Report as a
Basis for an Expert Opinion

Subpart A demonstrates how logic strongly indicates that at least in some cases,
the trial judge should bar expert opinions supported by secondhand reported used as the
252
basis for the opinion under Rule 703.
Logic, however, is not the only force that shapes
253
the law.
Moreover, the use of secondhand reports is not a matter of common law in
most jurisdictions; there are statutes on point.254 In federal practice Rule 703 governs, and
the majority of jurisdictions have state statutes modeled after Rule 703.255 What issues
arise under the statute?
Did the drafters perceive a distinction between the facts recited in the attorney's
hypothetical question and facts stated in secondhand reports?
It is understandable that the courts and legislatures have insisted that the facts
recited in hypothetical questions be supported by independent, admissible evidence. Aside
from the independent evidence, the only mention of the fact is the attorney's reference in
the question he or she poses to the expert. In virtually every American jurisdiction, there is
a pattern jury instruction that the attorney's statements during trial are not evidence.2 5 6

249
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250
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251
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252 Dana G. Deaton, The Daubert Challenge to the Admissibility ofScientific Evidence, 60 AM.
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(1996).
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However, the drafters of Rule 703 viewed secondhand reports as having much
more substance than an attorney's bare assertion.257 Rather than emanating from attorneys,
in the words of the Advisory Committee Note, secondhand reports come from other
sources such as "nurses, technicians and . . . doctors . . . .,258 The Note adds that, to an
extent, the witness screens or "expertly perform[s]" a "validation" of the report.259 For
instance, over the course of his or her career a forensic pathologist gains considerable
experience working with findings from toxicology laboratories and in the process the
pathologist may develop a "special talent[]" for evaluating such findings.260 The Note
concludes by pointing out that experts "make[] life-and-death decisions in reliance upon"
261
such secondhand reports.
If the expert is willing to place such faith in secondhand
262
Professor Rice has gone to the length of
reports, it seems silly to bar their use at trial.
arguing that the expert's screening creates such a strong inference of trustworthiness that
any secondhand report passing muster under Rule 703 should be treated as admissible
263
hearsay and received as substantive evidence.
Citing Professor Rice, Professors Kaye,
Bernstein, and Mnookin observe that many secondhand reports are at least as reliable as
264
the out-of-court statements routinely admitted under some hearsay exceptions.
Even if
one is unwilling to go as far as Professor Rice, the drafters' conclusion that a secondhand
report is a more substantial basis for an expert opinion than an attorney's statement in a
hypothetical question is defensible.
If the drafters discerned a distinction between secondhand reports and an
attorney's statement in a hypothetical question, did they also manifest an intent to treat
secondhand reports differently procedurally? In particular, did they manifest an intent to
dispense with any necessity for the proponent of an opinion based on secondhand reports
to present independent, admissible evidence of the facts stated in the reports?
The Advisory Committee Note to Rule 703 not only demonstrates that the
drafters perceived a distinction between secondhand reports and an attorney's reference to
a fact in a hypothetical question. More importantly, the Note also indicates that given the
perceived distinction, the drafters wanted to treat hypothetical questions and questions
265
based on secondhand reports differently in a procedural sense.
Early in the first
paragraph in the Note, the drafters mention the requirement that the proponent of a
hypothetical question must present independent evidence of the facts recited in the
266
hypothesis.
The drafters describe the variant of the hypothetical question in which the
expert attends trial, "hear[s] the testimony establishing the facts,"267 and later opines on
268"
the basis of the testimony that has already been admitted.
In the middle of the
paragraph, the drafters shift the focus from the traditional hypothetical question practice to
269
their innovation permitting reliance on secondhand reports.
In the third to last sentence
257
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258
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259
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260
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in the paragraph, the drafters state that they intend to allow proponents to use secondhand
reports "with[out] the expenditure of substantial time in producing and examining various
authenticating witnesses."270 In the next sentence, the drafters assert that the witness's
"'validation, expertly performed and subject to cross-examination, ought to suffice for
judicial purposes."271
Those two sentences are informative. Requiring the proponent to present
independent, admissible evidence of the truth of the secondhand reports would directly
frustrate the drafters' express intent to obviate the need for the proponent to expend
.1
,272
"substantial time in producing and examining various authenticating witnesses.
Furthermore, if the presentation of such evidence is a formal requirement, the expert's
screening of the secondhand report no longer "suffice[s]" as a basis for introducing the
opinion.273 Adding that requirement as a judicial gloss would flatly contradict the intent
clearly expressed in the Advisory Committee Note. Whatever the appeal or merit of the
logic underlying the 703 majority's position in Williams, it is difficult, if not impossible,
to justify construing Rule 703 as a mandate that the proponent submit such evidence as a
274
condition precedent to presenting the expert opinion to the factfinder.
Even if the drafters intended to treat hypothetical questions and questions based
on secondhand reports differently, is the differential treatment unconstitutional?
If the 703 majority in Williams is correct, the admission of an expert's opinion
based on secondhand reports as substantive evidence is illogical when the record does not
contain sufficient, admissible evidence of the facts stated in the reports. Does that
conclusion damn Rule 703 to unconstitutionality?
It certainly does not have that effect in civil actions. Consider the related issue of
the constitutionality of "illogical" presumptions in civil cases: presumptions in which the
basic fact lacks sufficient probative value to support an inference of the existence of the
275
276
presumed fact.
On the civil side, the due process clause imposes minimal constraints.
The prevailing view is that the presumption can be constitutional even when, without
more, the basic fact would not support a rational, permissive finding that the presumed
277
fact exists.
In fashioning a presumption for a civil case, the court or legislature may
consider factors other than probability.278 For example, they may consider policy factors
and convenience.279 The decisionmaker may consider the very sorts of factors that the
drafters mentioned in the Advisory Committee Note accompanying Rule 703.280 The
drafters could reasonably conclude that if the witness has "expertly performed" a
"'validation"281 of a secondhand report of a fact, there is little to be gained by also
requiring admissible evidence of the fact. Further, the drafters may legitimately weigh the
270

Id.; see also 29 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & VICTOR JAMES GOLD, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE:

EVIDENCE § 6272 (1st ed. 1997).
271 FED. R. EVID. 703 advisory
committee's note.
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id.
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id
Williamsv. Illinois, 132 S. Ct. 2221, 2225 (2012).
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2 CHARLES TILFORD MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE 522 (6th ed.
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inconvenience of "the expenditure of substantial time in producing and examining various
authenticating witnesses."282 That inconvenience was one of the policy factors the Court
2813
weighed in Cliquot's Champagne.
Criminal cases are a different matter. There are at least two situations in which
the adoption of the 703 majority's position could lead to a finding of a constitutional
violation. First, assume that in Williams, the Cellmark report was a formal certificate, like
the certified reports in Mellendez-Diaz284 and Bullcoming.28 If that has been the case,
Justice Thomas would have sided with the four dissenters on the question of whether the
report was testimonial. He concurred with the plurality on the testimonial issue only
because the Cellmark report was not a "formalized statement[] . . . characterized by
solemnity .... " If we vary the facts in that respect, there would have been five votes
both for the proposition that the report was testimonial and that Lambatos's reference to
the report was used for the truth of the content of the report. On those assumptions, a
majority of the justices would have found a violation of the Sixth Amendment
Confrontation Clause.
Justice Alito's plurality opinion suggests another possibility. In footnote 8, the
justice mentions the Court's 1979 decision in Jackson v. Virginia.
In Jackson, the
Supreme Court announced that the Due Process Clause controls the standard the trial
judge must use to determine whether the prosecution has sustained its initial burden of
production and made out a submissible case for the jury.2 More specifically, the Court
ruled that the trial judge must determine that a hypothetical juror could find the existence
of every essential element of the charge beyond a reasonable doubt.28 The prosecution
must meet its burden by presenting admissible, substantive evidence of each element of
290
the offense.
Suppose that in a given case, the only substantive prosecution evidence of
an essential element is an expert opinion resting on secondhand reports. Assume further
that the record does not contain admissible, independent evidence of the truth of an
essential premise supported by only a secondhand report. Citing the view of the 703
majority in Williams, the defense could argue that it is illogical to treat the opinion as
substantive evidence absent such admissible corroborating evidence.291 Research reveals
no case in which a defense counsel has pressed this argument, but post Williams it may be
only a matter of time before someone does.
While these constitutional attacks are viable, like the Rule 403 argument
discussed in subpart IV.A.2, they do not amount to facial attacks on Rule 703 itself. For
292
the most part, the Supreme Court has confined facial constitutional attacks to legislation
293
burdening First Amendment activity.
In other contexts, a constitutional attack must be

282
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284 Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305
(2009).
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Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705, 2707 (2011).
Williams v. Illinois, 132 S. Ct. 2221, 2261 (2012) (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment).

Id. at 2238 n.8 (citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 314 (1979)).

288 Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 314 (1979).
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Id. at 313-14.
Id. at 313-14, 317.
Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2258.

But see Bergerv. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 51 (1967) (a Fourth Amendment case involving electronic
surveillance).
293 Arriagav. Mukasey, 521 F.3d 219, 223 (2d Cir. 2008) (explaining that facial
constitutional attacks are
"generally limited to statutes that threaten First Amendment interests."); United States v. Dang, 488 F.3d 1135,
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as-applied. If a court adopted the view of the 703 majority in Williams, the court might
294
find that a particular application of 703 violated the Fifth or Sixth Amendment.
29 5
However, even in a criminal case the court would not strike down Rule 703 entirely.

V.

CONCLUSION
296

There are many variations of the famous legend of the Gordian Knot.
According to one version, at one time the Phrygians were without a king.297 An oracle
predicted that an eagle would land on the cart of the new king.298 A peasant named
Gordias was driving his ox-cart into town when an eagle landed on the cart.299 Gordias
was proclaimed king.3 0 0 Out of gratitude, Gordias's son Midas dedicated the cart to the
Phyrygian gods and tied the cart to a post with an intricate knot.301 An oracle later
prophesied that whoever untied the knot would become the king of all Asia.302 While
wintering nearby in 333 B.C., Alexander the Great was challenged to untie the knot.3 0 3
Alexander could not unravel the mystery of the knot.304 Frustrated, he unsheathed his
305
sword and slashed through the rope-cutting the Gordian knot.
The expression, 'cutting
the Gordian knot," has become a metaphor for overcoming a seemingly intractable
problem by a bold stroke.
The remarks of the 703 majority in Williams have converted the evidentiary
status of secondhand reports used under Rule 703 into a Gordian knot of sorts. Those
remarks introduce a tension into Rule 703 jurisprudence. When a secondhand report is an
essential premise of an expert opinion, the logic of the 703 majority's position points to
the substantive conclusion that the lack of independent, admissible evidence of the facts
stated in the report renders the opinion irrelevant. In turn, that substantive conclusion
seems to dictate the procedural outcome that at least in extreme cases, the judge should
exclude the opinion and bar its presentation to the jury. However, that logic collides with
the legislative intent manifest in the original Advisory Committee Note to Rule 703.306
The drafters asserted that the expert's screening of the second report ought to "suffice."307
The drafters were equally emphatic that it would be unnecessary for the expert's
proponent to go to the length of incurring "the expenditure of substantial time in

1142 (9th Cir. 2007) (explaining that the constitutional claim must fail because the overbreadth doctrine does not
implicate "First Amendment protections."); Coleman v. DeWitt, 282 F.3d 908, 914 (6th Cir. 2002) ("Neither the
Supreme Court nor this court has applied the overbreadth doctrine when the First Amendment was not
implicated."); Edward J. Imwinkelried & Donald N. Zillman, An Evolution in the FirstAmendment: Overbreadth
Analysis andFree Speech Within the Military Community, 54 TEX. L. REV. 42, 50-55 (1975).
294
295

Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2223, 2232.
See id. at 2262, 2264.
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JOHN MAXWELL O'BRIEN, ALEXANDER THE GREAT: THE INVISIBLE ENEMY: A BIOGRAPHY
69 (1992).
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Id. at 68.
See id.
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producing and examining . . . authenticating witnesses. 308 The tension between the3 0 9703
majority's logic and the drafters' intent creates a knotty problem for the lower courts.
There may be a way to cut this Gordian knot. A few lower courts have treated
Rule 703 as a hearsay exception.310 In his often cited 1987 article on Rule 703, Professor
Rice called for an amendment to Rule 703 to convert the statute into a hearsay
exception.311 In the ensuing years other respected commentators have lent support to
312
Professor Rice's proposal.
That proposal squarely poses the question whether the
witness's expert screening of the secondhand report is a sufficient guarantee of the
313
Whatever else may be said about
report's reliability to lift the bar of the hearsay rule.
the wisdom of the proposal, it would directly and cleanly cut through the Gordian knot
created by the comments of the 703 majority in Williams. The problem would vanish
because any secondhand report used under Rule 703 would be automatically admissible as
substantive evidence of the truth of the fact stated in the report.
However, until some legislature or court is bold enough to adopt this proposal,
lower courts will have to cope with the tension generated by the 703 majority's position.
At the very least it would be advisable for lower courts to administer the sort of jury
instructions that Justice Alito approvingly mentioned in his plurality opinion. In an
extreme case in which the expert's proponent has presented no or clearly insufficient
admissible evidence of an essential premise in a secondhand report, the trial judge ought
to charge the jury that without such evidence the opinion is "entitled to no weight." In
such extreme cases the judge will have to struggle with the decision whether to take the
next step seemingly mandated by logic and bar the proponent from presenting the expert
opinion to the jury. That struggle is an important reminder of the contemporary relevance
of Justice Holmes's insight that "[t]he life of the law [is] not [exclusively] logic . . . 314

308

id.

The pun is obvious but apt.
WRIGHT & GOLD, supra note 53, at 318; United States v. Unruh, 855 F.2d 1363, 1376 (9th Cir. 1987) ("the
expert testimony exception to the hearsay rules"); United States v. Williams, 447 F.2d 1285, 1290 (5th Cir. 1971)
("this exception to the rule against hearsay").
3 Rice, supra note 48
at 587-88.
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